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Cal.

75 CaI.Rptr. 790
In ro David Ollvor HAYES
on Habeas Corpus.
Cr. 11647.

punishments for single criminal act or
omIssIon. West's Ann.Vehicle Code, §§
14601,23102; West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654.
4. CrimInal Law *'>1209

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
March 17, 1969.

Proceeding on petition for writ of
habeas corpus by a motorist who had been
convicted of driving motor vehicle on a
public street while his driving privilege
had been suspended and while he was
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that
imposition of sentences for driving while
license was suspended and driving while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor
was not contrary to statute proscribing
against infliction of multiple punishments
for single criminal act or omission.
Petition denied.
Traynor, C. I., and Tobriner and Sullivan, JJ., dissented.
Opinion 69 CaI.Rptr. 310, 442 P 2d 366,
vacated.

I. Criminal Law €=>1209

Statute proscribing multiple punish.
ment is not limited to provisions of Penal
Code, but embraces penal provisions in
other codes including those found in Vehicle Code. West's Ann.Vehicle Code, §§
14601, 23lO2; West's Ann.Pen.Code, §

654.
2. Criminal Law

~1209

Statute proscribing multiple punishments refers not to any physical act or
omission which might perchance be common
to all of a defendant's violations, but to a
defendant's criminal acts or omissions.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654.
3. CrimInal Law €=>1209

Imposition of sentences
while license was suspended
while under the influence of
liquor was not contrary to
scribing against infliction

for driving
and driving
intoxicating
statute proof multiple

Proximity in time between criminal
acts does not preclude multiple punishment under statute. West's Ann.Pen.Code,
§ 654.
5. Criminal Law *'>200(1)

Statute's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and distinct from its
preclusion of multiple punishment; and
rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against harassment
which is not necessarily related to punishment to be imposed, and double prosecution
may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible. West's Ann.Pen.Code,

§ 654.
6. Criminal Law c&=>1209

Statute proscribes multiple punishment for single act or omission which is
made punishable by different statutes, that
is, a single criminal act or omission. West's
Ann.Pen.Code, § 654.

Kenneth M. Wells, Public Defender, and
Charles G. Fredericks, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H.
Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws
and Arnold O. Overoye, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
for respondent.
MOSK, Justice.
On December 30, 1966, petitioner David
Oliver Hayes drove a motor vehicle for
some 13 blocks in violation of Vehic1e
Code section 14601 (with knowledge of a
suspended license) and Vehicle Code section 23lO2 (while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.) He pleaded guilty to
and was sentenced for both offenses. Petitioner now assen:s that imposition of sentences for both violations is contrary to the
proscription against multiple punishment
contained in Penal Code section 654. We
have concluded that petitioner's contention
lacks merit.
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[1] Section 654 provides that "An act
or omission which is made punishable in
different ways by. different provisions of
this Code niay be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case can it be
punished under more than one * • *."
The interdiction is not limited to the provisions of the Penal Code, but embraces
penal provisions in :other codes as well, including those found in the Vehic1e Code.
(Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.
2d 11, 18 fn., I, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d
839; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711,
204 P.2d 321.)

The key to application of section 654 is
in the phrase "act or omission": a defendant may be punished only once for each
distinct "act or omi~ision" committed. There
have been numerotls attempts in the cases
to define a single "act," with varying degrees of clarity. Section 654 has been held
to apply, for example, where the multiple
violations are "necessarily included offenses" (People v. Knowles (l950) 35 Cal.
2d 175, 186, 217 P.2d 1) and where there
is a single "intent and objective" underlying a course of criminal conduct (Neal
v. State of California (1960) supra, 55
Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839)
but not where there are mUltiple victims
(id.). Most of the cases construing section 654 can be resolved by application of
one or the other of these theories. (See,
e. g., In re Ford (1967) 66 Cal.2d 183, 57
Cal.Rptr. 129, 424 P.2d 681 [kidnaping of
three victims]; in re Ward (1966) 64 Cal.
2d 672, 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400
[kidnaping with intent to rob and robbery] ;
People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577, 320
P.2d 5 [abortion and resulting death];
People v. Craig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 110
P.2d 403 [rape and statutory rape]; People v. Pater (1968) 267 A.C.A. 1027, 73
CaI.Rptr. 823 [grand theft-auto and driving vehicle without owner's consent].) Un-

fortunately, these formulae are of only
limited utility in the instant case, and we
therefore begin anew with a direct anaIysis of the statute and its application to the
facts before us,1
[2] To put petitioner's entire adventure
into a few words: he drove his car with
an invalid license and while intoxicated.
Initially, it is temptingly easy to extract,
as petitioner urges us to do, the single act
of "driving," obviously common to both of
the charged offenses, and to apply section
654 to this case on the theory that "driving"
was petitioner's only uact or omission."
However, to do so would be no more justified than to extract the act of "possession"
from a charge of possessing two different
items of contraband, an approach long rejected by our courts. (E. g., People v.
Schroeder (1968) 264 A.C.A. 257, 267-268,
70 Cal.Rptr. 491 [multiple punishment for
simultaneous possession of various narcotic drugs, not precluded by section 654];
People v. Lockwood (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d
75, 82-83, 61 CaI.Rptr. 131 [same]; People
v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 350351, 337 P.2d 570 [same]; People v. Mandell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 93, 98-99, 202 P.
2d 348 [same]; People v. Wasley (1966)
245 CaI.App.2d 383, 53 Cal.Rptr. 877 [possession of different illegal weapons]; d.
People v. Schroeder, supra~ 264 A.C.A. at
pp. 268-269, 70 CaLRptr. 491 [possession
of single narcotic, a single offense]; People v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490,
260 P.2d 27 [possession and sale of same
narcotic].)
We cannot overlook the
crucial element: section 654 refers not to
any physical act or omission which might
perchance be common to all of a defendant's violations, but to a defendant's criminal acts or omissions. (See, e. g., In re
Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 395, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393; People v. Quinn
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 551, 555, 39 Cal.Rptr.
I

I. Our analysis herein is in no way intended to preclude application of the
above tests where appropriate, any more
than those tests themselves are mutually
exclusive. It is only because we find all
the foregoing formulae inapplicable that

we resort to the present approach. If
under any of the enunciated tests the
proscription of section 654 applies, a
contrary result under another test is irrelevant.
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393, 393 P.2d 705; People v. Brown (1958)
supra, 49 CaI.2d 577, 590, 320 P.2d 5;
People v. Branch, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d
at p. 4%, 260 P.2d 27).2 Indeed, section
654 itself makes this distinction evident,
since it refers to an act or omission "made
punishable" by different statutes.3 The
neutral act of driving, like the mere act
of possessing in the foregoing cases, when
viewed in a vacuum, is not "made punishable" by any statute.
[3] The proper approach, therefore, is
to isolate the var~ous criminal acts involved, and then to examine only those
acts for identity. In the instant case the
two criminal acts are (\) driving with a
suspended license and (2) driving while
intoxicated; they are in no sense identical

or equivalent. Petitioner is not being
punished twice-because he cannot be
punished at all-for the "act of driving."
He is being penalized once for his act of
driving with an invalid license and once
for his independent act of driving while
intoxicated.4
Moreover, we must not confuse simultaneity with identity: in both of the above
situations-driving as in this case and pos2. The language in Johnson is typical:
"The basic principle that forbids multiple punishment for one criminal act
[citations] precludes infliction of more
than one punishment for [a] series of
acts directed toward one criminal objective * * *."
(Italics added.) (65
Cal.2d at p. 395. 54 Cal.Rptr. at p. 874.
420 P.2d at p. 394 (per Traynor, C.
J.).)

3. Compare former section 1938 of the
New York Penal Law. referred to in
Neal as "identical with" section 654,
which uses the specific language. ".An
act or omission which is made criminal
and punishable * * *." (Italics added.)
4. On the ·other hand, the single criminal
act of driving 'with knowledge of an invalid license is arguably "made punishable" by both Vehicle Code section 14601
(driving with a suspended or revoked
license) and Vehicle Code section 12500
(unlicensed driving); and section 654
would therefore preclude multiple punishment under both sections.

session of contraband in the cited casesthe defendant committed two simultaneous
criminal acts, which coincidentally had in
common an identical noncriminal act. The
two simultaneous criminal acts of possessing substance X and possessing substance
Y share the common, "neutral" act of
possessing, just as they necessarily share
the common factor of lack of a valid prescription for the drugs. Likewise, the two
simultaneous-but distinct--criminal acts
of driving with a suspended license and
driving while intoxicated share the common, noncriminal act of driving.5 On the
date in question petitioner's act of driving
was criminal and simultaneously violated
two statutes because and only because of
the presence of both the unrelated accompanying acts of voluntary intoxication
and knowing possession of a suspended
license. Similarly, for example, if an individual went for a walk in possession of
a loaded gun while he was intoxicated and
unclothed, he would by the single neutral
act of walking-or, more accurately, being
in a "public place"-simultaneously violate
three separate and unrelated statutes. (Pen.
Code, §§ 12031, subd. (a); 647, subd. (f);
314.) 6 Those three statutes, however,
5. As a further illustration of the analogy:
Petitioner could be said to have driven
in possession of a suspended license and
in "possession" (in his system) of intoxicating liquor. Again, possession is the
neutral or noncriminal identical factor;
but the criminal acts are distinctive.
6. Petitioner attaches significance to the
fact that driving was an essential element in both of his offenses, citing a
statement first made in In re Chapman
(1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 390, 273 P.2d
817. 819: "It is only when the two offenses are committed by the 8ame act or
when that act is e88ential to both that
they may not both be punished."
(Italics added.)
Aside from the dubious
vitality of this dictum (see People v.
Collin. (1963) 220 CaI.App.2d 563, 579,
83 Cal.Rptr. 638). "essentiality" in and
of itself was and is not a sufficient test
of the applicability of section 654. On
closer scrutiny. in fact, the quoted statement itself presupposes the existence of
a single ("same") act; and we have
seen that the only single acts that are
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would be violated not by the one, noncriminal act of being ill a public place but
necessarily by three simultaneous though
separate criminal acts. Once again, we
must distinguish idetl·tical noncriminal acts
from simultaneous criminal acts umade
punishable" by law."
[4] In attempting to equate simultaneity with identity, petitioner argues that
"There was no evid€~nce his driving without a license precedl~d the commencement
of the driving while under. the influence."
Thus if petitioner had begun driving while
intoxicated at 11 :50 p. m., and at midnight
his license had expired but he had continued to drive, he apparently would concede that he could be punished for the
two distinct acts of driving while intoxicated (before midnight) and driving with an
expired license (after midnight). This
arbitrary and wholly artificial distinction
is unpersuasive. While separation in time
may, in some contexts, make the legal
separation of acts mc're apparent (see, e. g.,
In re Ward (1%6) supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672,
678,51 Ca1.Rptr. Z72, 414 P.2d 400; Seiterle
v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 397,
401-403, 20 Ca1.Rptr. I, 369 P.2d 697;
People v. Howell (1%6) 245 Cal.App.2d
787, 792, 54 Ca1.Rptr. 92), the converse
does not necessarily follow. Proximity in
relevant for purposes of section 654 are
criminal acts. In the example suggested
above, none of the hypothetical acts is a
crime if committed in private; thus being or walking in a public place, like
driving in the instant case or like possession and lack of a prescription in tbe
narcotics example, is a necessary element
in ,all three crimes.. Yet this fact does
not make those neurral elements in themselves punishable or criminal, for none
is by itself a complete criminal act.
Thus the fortuitou:~ identity of "essential" neutral elements remains irrelevant
for our purposes.
7. To the possession and driving examples
might well be added. the cases which permit multiple punishment where f:l single
criminal act has more than one victim.
(See Neal v. State of California (1960)
supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20-21, 9 Ca1.Rptr.
607, 357 P.2d 839, and cases therein cited.) There might, for example, be one
common act of shooting a gun, but dis451 P.2d-2B

time between criminal events does not preclude mUltiple punishment (People v. Slobodian (1948) 31 Cal.2d 555, 191 P.2d 1);
and petitioner's acts were neither more nor
less multiple because of the fortuitous fact
that they were completely, rather than only
partly, simultaneous. (People v. Wasley
(1%6) supra, 245 Ca1.App.2d 383, 387, 53
Ca1.Rptr. 877.)8
Nor can we subscribe to a contention
that because petitioner may have had only
one "intent and objective"--driving-when
he committed the two violations, he .comes
within the ambit of the test established in
Neal v. State of California (1%0) supra,
55 Ca1.2d 11,9 Ca1.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839.
In Neal, the defendant had attempted murder by means of arson (burning down the
victims' house by igniting gasoline therein).
We viewed that circumstance as an indivisible "course of criminal conduct," the
criminal act of arson being only the means
toward an ultimate criminal objective of
murder. We stated that where there was
only a single Hintent and objective" involved in such a course of criminal conduct, section 654 precluded multiple punishment.
Here neither of the two violations can
realistically be viewed as a "means" toward
tinct criminal acts of killing victim X
and killing victim Y. However, as we
indicated in Neal, this particular test
takes in additional considerations, such
as degree of culpability, which might
be inappropriate to apply in other contexts.
8. The Attorney General, in apparent answer to petitioner's argument, has made a
belated attempt to establish that peti·
tioner may have been observed by the
arresting officer at two different times,
so that technically the offenses charged
were not "simultaneous." It is just such
strained rationale that a test dependent
on simultaneity would engender.
As
stated in People v. Pater (1968) supra,

267 A.C.A. 1027, 1033. 73 Cal.Rptr.
823, a "necessarily included offense"
case, UNeither clocks, calendars nor county boundaries convert one continuing
course of conduct into a series of criminal acts."
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to burn property but only as a means toward the single objective of murder. Moreover, the petitioner's intent and objective
to drive from one place to another is no
more relevant to our analysis than what he
intended to do when he arrived there. (See
In reWard (1966) supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672,
676, 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400.) Just
as it is the criminal "act or omission" to
which section 654 refers, it is the criminal
"intent and objective" that we established
as the test in Neal. (E. g., In re Johnson
(1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d 393, 395, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393 [intent to sell

and an invalid license.tO As we pointed out
in Neal~ however, "Section 654's preclusion
of multiple prosecution is separate and
distinct from its preclusion of multiple
punishment. The rule against multiple
prosecutions is a procedural safeguard
against harassment and is not necessarily
related to the punishment to be imposed;
double prosecution may be precluded even
'When double punishment is permissible."
(Italics added.) Neal v. State of California
(1960) supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 21, 9 Ca1.Rptr.
607, 612, 357 P.2d 839, 844. Therefore
we need not reexamine at this time the
validity of the conclusions in Morris as to
multiple prosecutions, other than to observe
that they are disapproved to the extent they

heroin];

might relate to a multiple punishment prob-

the other and as such a part of a single
course of criminal conduct, in the sense
that the arSOn in Neal was committed not

In re Ward

(1966) supra, 64

Cal.2d 672, 676, 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d
400 [intent to rob].) In Neal we found to

lem. l1

be crucial not the defendant's possible
intent and objective to acquire money, to
gain revenge or to ignite gasoline, but only
his intent and objective to commit murder.9
Although the absence of a single intent and
objective does not necessarily preclude application of section 654 (see fn. 1, ante),
it is clear that under the instant circumstances this test of Neal cannot be of aid
to defendant.

[6] In summation, then. section 654 of
the Penal Code proscribes multiple punishment for a single "act or omission which is
made punishable" by different statutes, i. e.,
a single criminal act or omission. Since the
mere act of driving is made punishable by
no statute, it is not the type of act or omission referred to in section 654. The acts
"made punishable" which this petitioner
committed were (1) driving with a suspended license and (2) driving while intoxicated. two separate and distinct criminal
acts; that they were committed simultaneOllsly and that they share in common the
neutral noncriminal act of driving does not
render petitioner's punishment for both

[5] Petitioner relies heavily upon People
v. Morris (1%5) 237 Cal.App.2d 773, 47
Ca1.Rptr. 253, which in a similar factual
situation declared that section 654 proscribed multiple prosecutions for drunk driving
9. Thus had the defendant there had the
completelY independent criminal objectives of murder (perhaps for vengeance)
and burning the bouse (to collect fire insurance). or had he attempted to kill his
victims with a gun and then set fire to
their house as an afterthought. he would
have been punishable for both arson and
attempted murder. (See People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 908, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 733. 428 P.2d 869; Seiterle v.
Superior Court (1962) supra, 57 Cal.
2d 397, 401, 20 Cal.Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d
697.)
10. A majority of the Morris court. given
substantially the same argument presented to us, rejected the "criminal act"

definition
to apply
tiality."
J., id., p.

for section 654 and appeared
the Ohapman test of "essen(But see dissent by _Whelan.
777, 47 Cal.Rptr. 253.)

II. We note that even where the issue is
multiple prosecution, the provisions of
section 654 cannot be employed to mislead
the court. Thus if a greater violation is
concealed in order to gain "immunity"
by prosecution for a lesser crime. section
654 will not apply. (Kellett v. Superior
Court (1966) 63 C.1.2d 822, 827-828,
48 Cal.Rptr. 366, oW9 P.2d 206; Gail v.
Municipal Court (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d
1005. 60 Cal.Rptr. 91; Hampton v. Municipal Court (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 689.
M C.l.Rptr. 760.)
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crimes in conflict with Penal Code section
654.
The order to show cause is discharged,
and the petition for writ of habeas corpus
is denied.
McCOMB, PETERS and BURKE,
conCUT.

JJ.,

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
Section 654 of the Penal Code provides
that "An act or omission which is made
punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this c:ode may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no
case can it be punished under more than
one." Underlying this deceptively simple
language is a legislative determination that
essential1y unitary c:riminal activity shall
not be punished more than once regardless
of how many distinct crimes it may comprise. The statute "has been applied not
only where there was but one 'act' in the
ordinary sense * :+ * but also where a
course of conduct violated more than one
statute and the problem was whether it
comprised a divisible transaction which
could be punished under more than one
statute within the meaning of section 65.1.."
(People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577,
591, 320 P.2d 5, 14. ) Since its application
is not limited to cases in which the identical
conduct violates two statutes or one offense is necessarily :inc1uded in the other 1
(Neal v. Stite of California (1960) 55
Cal.2d 11, 18, 9 CaU;:ptr. 607, 611, 357 P.2d
839, 843, and cases cited), the words ail
"act ... ... '" made! punishable '" ... '"
'by different provisions" do not refer to
the entire criminal t::onduct proscribed by
each provision but to conduct significantly
common to both.
Thus, in People v. Logan (1953) 41 Cal.
2d 279, 290, 260 P.2d 20, 26, we held that a
defendant who committed robbery by striking his victim with a. baseball bat could be
I. For example, a single act of statutory
rape would in every case also constitute
contributing to th·e delinquency of a
minor, and the laUer offense is there-

punished only once for that act, since the
"one act of inflicting force with the bat
cannot both be punished as assault with a
deadly weapon and availed of by the
People as the force necessary to constitute
the crime of robbery." Although the act of
striking the victim was not by itself made
punishable by different provisions of the
Penal Code, it nevertheless fell within
section 654 because it was an essential
element of both the robbery and the assault.
(In re Chapman (1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 389,
273 P.2d 817.)
Moreover, there is no requirement that
the act common to both crimes be punishable before section 654 comes into play. In
Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.
2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839, the act
common to both crimes was the act, not
punishable by itself, of throwing lighted
gasoline. It was made punishable as arson
because the gasoline was thrown into a
house and as attempted murder because it
was thrown onto human beings. Since it
"is the singleness of the act and not of the
offense that is determinative" (People v.
Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 187, 217
P.2d I, 8), Neal could not be punished for
both of those crimes. In People v. Craig
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 458, 110 P.2d 403,
the act common to both statutory and forcible rape was the act, innocent by itself,
of sexual intercourse.. (See In re Lane
(1962) 58 Ca1.2d 99, 104, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857,
372 P.2d 897.) Although the additional
elements of the force used and the age of
the victim made the act punishable under
different subdivisions of section 261 of the
Penal Code, the defendant could be punished only once.
The foregoing cases control this case, for
petitioner's single act of driving was an
essential element, indeed the only active
element, of the two crimes charged, namely
driving with knowledge that his driving
privilege was suspended (Veh.Code §
14601) and driving while under the infore necessarily included in the former.
(People v. Greer (1947) 30 CaI.2d 589,

597-598, 184 P.2d 512.)
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fluence of intoxicating liquor.
§ 23102.)

(Veh.Code,

Cases involving simultaneous possession
of different items of contraband are obviously not to the contrary (e. g., People v.
Schroeder (1968) 264 A.CA. 257, 267-268,
70 Cal.Rptr. 491 [multiple punishment for
simultaneous possession of various narcotic
drugs, no~ precluded by section 654];
People v. Lockwood (1%7) 253 Cal.App.2d
75, 82-33, 61 Cal.Rptr. 131 [same]; People
v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 350351,337 P.2d 570 [same]; People v. Mandell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 93, 98-99, 202 P.
2d 348 [same]; People v. Wasley (1966)
245 Cal.App.2d 383, 387, 53 Cal.Rptr. 877
[possession of different illegal weapons]

j

C£. People v. Schroeder, supra, 264 A.CA.
at pp. 268-269, 70 Cal.Rptr. 491 [possession
of single narcotic a single offense]; People
v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 4954%, 260 P.2d 27 [possession and sale of
same narcotic]), for the possession of one
item is not essential to the possession of another separate item. One does not possess
in the abstract; possession is meaningless
unless something is possessed. The possession of each separate item is therefore
a separate act of possession.
Of course, had petitioner been convicted
of a "crime" of being intoxicated and a
"crime" of knowing that his driving privilege was suspended, the possession cases
would be in point, and section 654 would
not preclude punishing petitioner for both
offenses even though he committed them
simultaneously, In such a case there would
2. Both Winchell and Was1ev correctly
upheld dual sentences for simultaneous
but different "acts." In Winchell the
defendant simultaneously violated Penal
Code section 12021, forbidding possession
by an ex-convict of a pistol capable of
being concealed on his person, and Penal
Code section 466, forbidding possession
of "a picklock, crow, keybit, or other
instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or cnter into any building."
In Wa.'flev the defendant simultaneously violated section 12021, proscribing possession of a concealable pistol by an exconvict, and section 12020, proscribing
possession of a sawed-off shotgun by "any

be no act of petitioner common to the two
crimes. Petitioner, however, was not convicted of being intoxicated and knowing
that his driving privilege was suspended
but of a single act of driving while intoxicated and while his driving privilege was
suspended. It is the singleness of that act
that is determinative.
The Attorney General contends, however,
that Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102
have different public purposes directed at
distinct evils, and that the driver who violates both statutes simultaneously should
be doubly punished because he is invading
two social interests that the Legislature had
designated for distinct protection by the
enactment of two different statutes. In
a jurisdiction without a multiple punishment rule like that of Penal Code section
654, this "distinct evil" test might aid the
courts in ascertaining whether the Legislature intended cumulative punishments for
simultaneous violations of statutes like
Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102.
(See Twice in Jeopardy (1965) 75 Yale L.J.
262, 320; Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy (1949) 58 Yale
L.J. 513, 523.) In California, however,
when the rule of section 654 precluding
multiple punishment applies, the courts cannot invoke the "distinct evil" test to evade
that statutory rule. (But see People v.
Winchell (1967) 248 Ca1.App.2d 580, 596,
56 Cal.Rptr. 782; People v. Wasley, supra,
245 Ca1.App.2d 383, 386, 53 Ca1.Rptr. 877;
People v. Poe (1965) 236 Ca1.App.2d Supp.
928, 942, 47 Ca1.Rptr. 670.) •
person." The decisions mention the different public purposes served by the two
statutes violated by the respective defendants, but they do not purport to announce a "distinct evils" test contrary
to section 654.
Since possession of a physical object
is an "act" within the menning of section 654, the defendant who possesses
two different kinds of contraband in violation of two different statutes is committing two different "acts" of proscribed
possession.
The Poe cuse, supra, 236 Cal.App.
2d Supp. 928, 942, 47 Cal.Rptr. 670, unlike Winchell and Wasley, decided the
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Moreover, any notio-n that' a California

The Attorney General contends that mul-

court can multiply sentences because defendant's single act violates statutes that,
in the court's 'vievl, vindicate different
societal interests should have been dispelled

tiple punishment should be allowed in accord with the statement in Neal v. State of
California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 20, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 607, 61Z, 357 P.Zd 839, 844, that "the

hs People v. BroWn, supra,

purpose of the protection against multiple

49 Ca1.2d 577, 590, :320 P.2d 5 (defendant
cannot be sentenced hoth for criminal abortion and for murder caused by the same
act), and People Craig, supra, 17 Ca1.2d
453, 457, 110 P.Zd 403 (defendant cannot

punishment is to insure that the defendant's
punishment will be commensurate with his
criminal liability." The Neal opinion made
the quoted statement in the course of an
inquiry into legislative purpose 3 with respect to the extent of punishment of a defendant who criminally injures or kills
more than one victim. In holding that section 654 does not forbid the separate punishment of a defendant's multiple crimes
of violence that harm multiple victims, even
though a single physical movement of the
defendant is the one common cause ,of injuries or deaths of the several victims,
Neal speaks of the multiple victim problem
in terms of culpability 4 and consequences.1S

by decisions such

v.

be sentenced for, both statutory rape and
forcible rape committed by one act of

intercourse forced upon a 16-year-old girl;
compare People v. McCollum (1931) 116
Ca1.App. 55, 58, 2 P.2d 432, a prosecution
for both statutory rape and incest resulting
from defendant's one act of intercourse
with his 16-year-old daughter; the trial
court correctly anti,:ipated the Craig decisio!l, but the appellc~te court withheld judgment on the question).
double punishment issue erroneously and
should therefore be disapproved. In Poe
precisely the same conduct of the defendants was n. trespass proscribed by
Penal Code section 602, subdivision
(j), and a contempt proscribed by Penal
Code section 166, subdivision 4. The appellate court upheld dual sentences for
this single "ace' 011 the theory that the
trespass was a crime against property
whereas contempt was a crime against
the authority' of the superior court.
3. It is a legislBt~ve, not n judicinl, function to fix the i extent of punishment that
can be imposed II for any particular crime
or group of eriml~s. Subject only to
constitutional liinitations, the Legislature
can define crimes und set their punishments as it sees :rit. (Bell v. United
States (1955) 349 U.S. 81, 82, 75 S.Ot.
620, 99 L.Ed. 905; ,People v. Knowles
(1950) 35 Cal.~d 175, 181, 217 P.2d 1;
In re Rosencrantz (1928) 205 Cal. 534,
587-538, 271 P; 902.) The courts cannot impose c~~in:'ll penalties ,for conduct that the ,~gisIature hM not made
punishable (U~!ted States v. Wilt berger
(1820) 5 Wbea . 76, 93, 18 U.S. 76, 93.
5 L.Ed. 37: Matter of Ellsworth (1913)
165 Cal. 677" ~1, 133 P. 272; Havemeyer v. Superior Court (1890) 84 Cal.
327, 376. 24P. 121, 10 L.R.A. 627;
Pen. Code. § 15j or adjudge punishment
in excess of that aUlthorized by the Legislature. (People: v. Lein ·(1928) 204 Cal.
84, 87, 266 P; 5:16; People v. Riley

(1874) 48 Cal. 549; In re Rye (1957)
152 Cal.App.2d 594. 596, 313 P.2d 914;
In re Carmignani (1925) 71 Cal.App.
632, 633, 235 P. 1033.) The Legislature
can and does command multiple punishments for some crimes (e. g., Pen.Code,
67. 68. 98 [disqualification from or
forfeiture of office in addition to any
other punishment for .certain offenses])
and it authorizes the courts in their discretion to impose multiple punishments
for others (e. g., the familiar statutory
provision that a crime is punishable by
imprisonment, fine, or both). The Legislature could also, if it saw fit to do so,
expressly command or authorize mUltiple
sentences for a group of crimes, however
closely they might be related. Instead,
the California Legislature, so far as
multiple sentences for related crimes are
concerned. has seen fit to enact the general multiple punishment preclusion of
section 654.

n

4. "A defendant who commits an act of
violence with the intent to harm more
than one person or by a means likely
to cause harm to several persons is more
culpable than a defendant who harms
only one person." (55 Cal.2d at p. 20,
9 Cal.Rptr. at p. 612, 357 P.2d at p.
844.)
5. "Section 654 is not '* * * applicable where * * * one net has two
results each of which is a1'1 act of violence against the person of a separate
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Moreover, under the orthodox theory of
crime on which the Legislature based the
Penal Code, the act of killing A is essentially distinct fro"m the act of killing Beven
when a single muscular contraction of the
defendant is the common cause of both
deaths. The concept of punishment "commensurate with his criminal liability," used
in Neal as an aid to the determination of
legislative purpose in a multiple victim
case, cannot be wrenched from that context and invoked in the present case to
justify ignoring the controlling precedents
upon which the court in Neal relied in
holding that Neal could not be punished
both for arson and attempted murder.
The Attorney General 'also contends that
petitioner's uninterrupted and factually
indivisible course of driving (see People
individual.'" (55 Cal.2d at pp. 20-21,
9 CnI.Rptr. at p. 612, 357 P.2d nt p.
844, quoting from People v. Brannon
(1924) 70 Cnl.App. 225, 235-236, 283
P.88.)
6. The Neal opinion stated its "intent and
objective" test immediately after it had
quoted from People v. Brown, supra, 49
Cal.2d 577, 591. 320 P.2d 5. 14. the com·
ment thnt "Section 654 hus been applied not only where there was but one
'set' in the ordinary sense * * * but
also where a course of conduct violated
more than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible
transaction which could be punished under more than one statute within the
meaning of section 654."
Neither Neal nor Brown presented any
question of a "divisible" transaction. In
each of those cases one factually indivisible act was a common element of defendant's violation of two statutes. In Neal
the defendant threw and ignited gasoline
with intent to and did commit both
arson and attempted murder. In Brown
the defendant's act that was intended
to abort L also killed her. In both cases
section 654 forbade sentencing the defendant for the two crimes committed by the
one act, and there was no occasion to
inquire whether his offenses were or were
not "incident to one objective."
Other decisions cited in Neal and
Brown, however, show that Neal's "intent and objective" test should guide the
sentencing judge in cases presenting a
"course of action" or Htransaction" that,
by oversubtle division of the evidence

v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715, 204
P.2d 321) can be split to permit multiple
sentencing by application of the Neal "intent and objective" test (55 Cal.2d at p. 19,
9 Cal.Rptr. at p. 611, 357 P.2d at p. 843) :
UWhether a course of criminal conduct is
divisible and therefore gives rise to more
than one act within the meaning of section
654 depends on the intent and objective
of the actor. If all of the offenses were
incident to one objective, the defendant may
be punished for anyone of such offenses
but not for more than one." That test was
not designed to permit multiple sentencing
that section 654 clearly forbids but to preclude improper multiplication of sentences
when there is at least some arguable question as to the factual divisibility of defendant's course of criminal conduct.s
of acts and intents, could be split into
a series of discrete crimes proscribed
by different statutes directed against
basically the same kind of criminality.
(See, e. g., People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Cal.
2d 711, 713, 715, 204 P.2d 321 : People
v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d 589, 603, 184
P.2d 512; compare People v. Slobodian
(1948) 31 Cal.2d 555, 562, 191 P .2d 1.)
In such cases the sentencing court is
confronted with a state of facts that may
or may not come within "the meaning of
section 654" in the sense that, although
section 654 does not give a comprehensive or definitive rule enabling the solution of all multiple sentencing problems, it does indicate a general legislative
purpose of lenity so far as the multiplication of sentences is concerned. Sometimes (as in Greer) the statutes defining
the separate crimes in themselves will enable the court to ascertain the legislative purpose that they should not be
separately punished, without resort to
section 654. If, however, there remains a
doubt as to the legislative purpose concerning the multiplication of sentences,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of
lenity. (In re Tartar (1959) 52 Ca1.2d
250, 257, 339 P.2d 553: People v. Ralph
(1944) 24 Cal.2d 575,581, 150 P.2d 401;
see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740,
744-745, 4R Cnl.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d
948.) In this class of caSes "the meaning of section 654" and the "intent and
objective" test direct the courts toward
lenity in the same way that a judicial1Y
recognized "baste principle that forbids
multiple punishment for one criminal act"
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There is no such arguable question in
this case. Even if th,erc were, Neal would
support petitioner, for he had only the
single intent and oje(:tive to get from one
place to another. Th(~re is nothing in Neal
to indicate that the intent and objective of
the defendant must he criminal before it
may be deemed relevant in determining
whether a course of criminal conduct .is
not divisible So as to give rise to no mor~
than one act within the meaning of section
654. Although the Neal case and the cases
following it involved criminal intents and
objectives (see cases cited in footnote 6,
supra), that fact is not controlling. It is
wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence

of the defendant's intent and objective as
determinative just as it is wholly anomalous
to seize on the innocence of the act common
to both crimes as determinative. It is a
strange inversion that a defendant who
commits an act that is the essential and
crucial element of two crimes can be punished twice if that act by itself is i;mocent
or the defendant's intent and objective are
innocent but can be punished only once if
the common act or the intent and objective
are criminal.

forbids splitting a course of conduct into
multiple violations {If the sume statute
whenever there is El doubt os to the
propriety of such frllgmcntation. (In re
Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 393, 04
Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393.)
Neartt "intent and objcctivc" test also
governs sentencing in cases of multiple
convictions for both nn inchoate crime
(e. g., burglary, conspiracy, solicitation,
and like offenses that in fact and by definition are committ.oxI not ns ends in
themselves but as preparation for the
consummation of a further criminal purpose) and substanthe crimes committed
in execution of tbfl inchoate purpose.
There may be no single external "act"
necessarily common to the preparatory
offense Rnd the ultimate offense to bring
the CRse precisely within the preclUsion
of section 654, but by applicntion of the
I·intent and objective" test the legislative purpose exprem;:ed by that section
is effected. Illustrating this application
of Neal are People v. l\IcFarlnnd (1962)
58 Ca1.2d 748, 760-762, 26 Cal.Rptr.
473, 376 P.2d 449 (burglary with intent
to commit larceny and the larceny); Pco-

pIe v. Hicks (1965) 63 Cal.2d 764, 765766, 48 Cal.Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747
(burglary with intent to commit sexual
felonies and the consummated sex, offenscs); In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.
2d 685, 688, 68 Cal.Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d
161 (same); In re Cruz (1966) 64 Cal.
2d 178, 180-181, 49 Cal.Rptr. 289, 410
P.2d 825 (conspiracy to commit grand
theft and grand theft); In re Romano
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 826, 828, 51 Cal.Rptr.
910, 415 P.2d 798 (conspiracy, burglary,
and theft); In re Pratt (1967) 66 Cal.
2d 104, 156, 56 Cal.Rptr. 895, 424 P.2d
335 (kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and robbery); In rc Malloy (1967)
66 Cal.2d 252, 256, 57 Cal.Rptr. 345, 424
P.2d 929 (same). Examllics need not
be multiplied; the principle is plain.
(Sce Twice in .Jeopardy (19G5) supra, 65
Yale L.J. 262, 319; Kirchheimer, The
Act, the Offense, and Double .Jeopardy
(1949) supra, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 518;
ALI Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft (1962) § 1.07(1) (b), and
Tent. Draft No.5 (1956) (Comment to
fanner § 1.08 at pp. 37-38.)

TOBRINER and SULLIVAN,
cur.
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